On Governance and Institutions in Sudan

Now that the old king has been overthrown, will Sudan’s institutions survive a new one?

The people want to build a new Sudan

After long 30 years and four continuous months of peaceful anti-government protests, Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir was overthrown on 11 April 2019 to announce the end of what started as an Islamic Front coup d’état in 1989, famously known as the ‘National Salvation Revolution’. And under the umbrella of the Islamic Front, the National Congress and ‘transparent’, ‘inclusive’ elections he managed to stay in power regardless of deteriorating welfare, economic and political state. But, now that the deeply rooted regime is ‘gone’, what about the public institution in Sudan? And how would this change in power dynamics affect the country’s governance?

In their 2012 bestseller book, Why Nations Fail, Turkish-American economist Daron Acemoglu, and British economist and political scientist James A. Robinson wrote,

‘Inclusive economic and political institutions do not emerge by themselves. They are often the outcome of significant conflict between elites resisting economic growth and political change and those wishing to limit the economic and political power of existing elites.’

In 2018, Sudan scored 49 out 54 African countries on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). It scored 108.7 on the Fragile States Index, ranked as one of the top 10 fragile countries in the world. It also ranked 172 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The slightest term a person can use to describe the country’s institutes’ is extremely weak.

Daniel Kaufman, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) lead, indicated six dimensions to evaluate a country’s performance on governance, out of the six; this article would explore Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption.

Political stability and absence of violence

Figure (1) battle events in 2005 and 2014 respectively in Sudan and South Sudan. Image source: ACLED

By 2015, Sudan had 75 registered parties. In the past three decades, the country has already gone into civil war in the south, later separated in July 2011 when a referendum was carried as per the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It has also witnessed the infamous Darfur Genocide in the west, and went into battles in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and occasional “Skirmishes” on it borders with Eritrea and Libya. Figure (2) by The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows the density of battle events from 2005 and 2014 respectively in Sudan (2005) and later Sudan and South Sudan (2014).

On the other hand, there has been many youth or political party movements to bring about change. The following map by Jean-Bapitse Gallopin shows political stakeholders as of December 2018.

Figure (2) Formal actors in the Sudanese political crisis of 2018. Image source: Jean-Bapitse Gallopin

This view has changed after the Alliance for Freedom and Change formed in January 2019 shortly after the anti-government protests began, led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and 23 other signatories which consist of various profession-based unions including doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, professors, workers and trade unions, and civil and social groups. SPA has been the catalyst of the anti-government protests across Sudan, one of which was the million persons march to the Army HQ on 6 April which eventually turned into the massive sit-in, which led to the overthrow of Al Bashir. Although at the beginning the public did not have full information of SPA’s members except their spokesperson Mohammed Nagi Alasam, who made appearances in the media. Massive numbers of people answered their calls to protest and call for Al Bashir and his regime to step down. SPA was successful for its inclusive approach in that it represented various social groups of Sudan, focus on the youth, and its quick response to the comments and feedback given regarding the timing, place and organisation of the marches.

Government effectiveness

According to the World Governance Indicators, government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  

The public service in Sudan has been heavily politicised since the early days of the salvation regime. Back in the day, a wide number of the existing public servants were sent into early retirement for the sake of ‘public good’ and were replaced by the salvation government supporters who didn’t necessarily fit the job description. This continued further throughout the fresh graduates’ recruitment process which young graduates describe as tedious and frustrating as it relied on nepotism, ethnicity, political affiliation and not so much on skills, applicants recall being asked about historical Islamic battles on interviews for engineering jobs.

And when it comes to policy formulation, the country’s economic policies are a living example of the previous government’s floundering behaviour. After constantly falling short in controlling inflation, the Central Bank of Sudan extremely limited access to cash in hand. The withdrawal limit on ATM’s went from 2,000 Sudanese Pounds (SDG) a day (around USD50) to SDG500 (around USD12) – should there be cash on the machine. Direct branch withdrawals were limited to SDG2,000, which was granted after long queues and bargains with the bank’s staff. This harsh policy was implemented in a country where only 12% of the population made or received digital payments in 2014, hence cash was the main exchange mean. Implementing these policies was supposed to help push the public towards more digitalised financial services. However, it led to smashing the public trust in the financial system leading to a refrain from depositing any cash, a parallel market that sells cash for between account transfers and unprecedented levels of inflation.

Control of corruption

In the year 2010, WikiLeaks estimated that Al Bashir has siphoned a USD9 billion worth of oil money in foreign banks. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg as Al Bashir’s family, entourage and inner circle are all under question when it comes to building fortunes illegally. Sudan scored 16 of 100 on the CPI in 2018 labelling it as ‘highly corrupt’. The government has already announced a campaign of catching the so-called ‘Fat Cats’ in 2015, a rhetoric term for corruption lords, yet there were no cases taken to trials.

On another level, bribes have been the norm under the ridiculously low public service salaries and the complicated bureaucracy that encouraged citizens to simply bribe their way out.

Getting the institutions right is the answer but how?

Trust in public service is a key reform factor. This trust is obtained when public servants are independent, professional and accountable. This can only be achieved by tapping the nationalism factor which guided the people to avoid their differences and unite under a common front throughout the months of protests. Another important note is an inclusive reform that reshapes the image of public servants by giving them the respect they deserve. This can be done through building their capacities, improving working conditions and absorbing competent young graduates into the system on merit basis as they bring enthusiasm, a fresh prospective and a will to change.

And when it comes to corruption, transparency is always the answer. Clear guidelines of every public service should be put in place as well as a clear reporting system should anything goes off the track of the standard process. A good example is the ‘I paid a bribe’ app for civil service monitoring in India were citizens can report any bribing that takes place in front of them anonymously and all the reported cases are available to everyone along with the worth of the bribe to highlight the corruption prevalence in public institutions.

Another important factor is the civil society. A free independent civil society can oversee the whole reform process as well as coming up with further case-specific improvements.

The best time to reform Sudanese institutions was 30 years ago; second best time is now.

Jawhara Kanu is an economist with a postgraduate degree in Economics and Finance for Development from the University of Bradford. In addition to writing, her interests include political economy, development and women empowerment. After completing her bachelor’s degree in economics and finance in 2015, she has been working in development projects implementation in Sudan.